Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1988

Rocky Mountain State Bank v. Fire Insurance
Exchange : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Peter W. Billings; Michele Mitchell; Fabian and Clendenin; Attorneys for Appellee.
Philip R. Fishler, Stephen J. Trayner; Strong and Hanni; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Rocky Mountain State Bank v. Fire Insurance, No. 880345.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2304

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH SUPREME COURT

UTAH

DOCUMENT

BRlEfi

KFU
45.9

IS9

Wz-^

_ SgOSffi*

'worn* HQ>'

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE POSSESSION
OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK BY
THE COMMISSIONER OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS,

Case No. 880345

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Category 14(b)
v.
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from the Judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick

PETER W. BILLINGS, SR.
MICHELE MITCHELL
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
PHILIP R. FISHLER
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

^£?"

MAY 3 019*1

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE POSSESSION
OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK BY
THE COMMISSIONER OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS,

]
]
]

Plaintiff and Respondent,]
•

v.

Case No. 880345
Category 14(b)

;

FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from the Judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick

PETER W. BILLINGS, SR.
MICHELE MITCHELL
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
PHILIP R. FISHLER
STEPHEN J. TRAYNER
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

1

ISSUES PRESENTED

1

.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT

9

I
THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED SOUND DISCRETION IN FINDING NO
CAUSE TO LIFT THE STAY

9

A.
B.

THE STATUTORY STAY CANNOT BE LIFTED FOR A CLAIMANT WHO
HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH THE STATUTE

10

THERE IS NO CAUSE TO LIFT A STAY WHEN THE ISSUE STAYED
X O

1.

/VLJXVIJXXU X

V/W

J\iT

IT -ClXvLi

o e * e o o o c o c o 4 o o o « « o o e o e e o c e e « « e e « « * « « « * - ^ > < £

The Insurer Has No Clear Right ofContribution
Under Utah Lav.

14

THE INSURER'S DESIRE TO KEEP THE BANK IN THE UNDERLYING
ACTION PROVIDES NO CAUSE FOR LIFTING THE STAY.

15

DUE STATUTORY NOTICE WAS PROVIDED AND THERE WAS NO
WAIVER OF THE STATUTORY STAY. ........

18

THE INSURER PRESENTS THE COURT WITH THE "WHOLE PICTURE"
IN ITS JURY VERDICT APPEAL.

18

II
THE RECEIVER PROPERLY DENIED THE INSURER'S CLAIM FOR CONTRIBUTION AGAINST THE BANK*S ASSETS

19

C.
D.
B.

A.

RES JUDICATA REQUIRED THE RECEIVER TO DENY THE
INSURER' S CLAIM FOR CONTRIBUTION

20

B.

NO RIGHT OF ACTION FOR CONTRIBUTION HAS ARISEN

21

C.

NO RIGHT OF ACTION CAN BE CREATED AFTER A BANK'S
INSOLVENCY

23

III
UTAH'S TAKEOVER ACT PRESERVES THE INSURER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
TO DUE PROCESS AND ACCESS TO THE COURTS. .
26
A.
B.
C.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS
COURT
«...

26

THE TAKEOVER ACT PROVIDES REASONABLE PROCEDURES FOR
CLAIMS AGAINST A CLOSED BANK

27

THE TAKEOVER ACT SATISFIES DUE PROCESS AND OPEN COURT
REQUIREMENTS

28

1.
2.

3.

4.

The Insurer Obtained Timely Judicial Review of
Administrative Process

29

The Insurer's "Right" of Contribution is not an
Accrued, Individual Right Protected by the
Constitution

31

The Takeover Act Provides Effective, Reasonable
Alternative Remedies for Vindication of Any Constitutional Interest

31

The Takeover Act Eliminates a Clear Economic Evil....33

CONCLUSION

35

ADDENDUM

A-l

-ii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Citation

Page

CASES CITED
American National Bank of Jacksonville v. FDIC. 710 F.2d 1528,
1540 (11th Cir. 1983)

24

Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985)

31

Berry

32

Berry

33

Brunver v. Salt Lake County. 551 P.2d 521, 522 (Utah 1976)

21

Bundy v. Century Equipment Co.. Inc.. 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah,
1984)

13

Bundy v. Century Equipment Co. Inc., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah
1984)

26

Coit Independent Joint Venture v. FSLIC. 57 U.S.L.W. 4347
(March 21, 1989

29, 32 and 33

Cruz v. Montova. 660 P.2d 723, 728 (Utah 1983

17

El Paso Natural Gas v. State. 599 P.2d 175, 178 (Ariz. 1979)...21
FDIC v. McKniqht. 769 F.2d 658, 661 (10th Cir. 1985)

23

James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah App. 1987)

27

Jones v. Schwendiman. 721 P.2d 893, 894 (Utah 1986)

12

Krukievicz v. Draper. 725 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Utah 1986)

15

Lanqlev v. FDIC. 484 U.S.

25

, 98 L.Ed.2d 340, 347 (1987)

-in-

Makin v. Liddle, 696 P.2d 918,919 (Idaho App. 1985)

20

Marqulies By and Through Marqulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195,
1200 (Utah 1985)

9

Patten v. Knutzen. 646 F. Supp 427, 430 (D. Colo. 1986)

17

Pilcher v. State Department of Public Services, 663 P.2d 450, 455
(Utah 1983)

11

Seeborg v. General Motors Corp.. 588 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Or. 1978)20
State Department of Social Services v. Hiqqs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000
(Utah 1982)

11

State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 362 (Utah App. 1989)

27

Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667
at 672

26

Unigard Insurance Co. v. City of LaVerkin. 689 P.2d 1344 (Utah
1984) ..

11

Unigard Insurance Company v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344,
1346 N.2 (Utah, 1984)

16

Unigard Insurance Co. v. City of Laverkin, 689 P.2d 1344, 1346
(Utah 1984)

22

57 U.S.L.W. 4347 at 4353

30

57 U.S.L.W. 4347 at 4353

33

57 U.S.L.W. at 4353

30

-iv-

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
C

Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, S1448,

pp. 263-65. (1971)

17

C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, S4433
(1971)

.

Restatement (Second) of Judgments S19, Comment (g) (1980)

21
20

STATUTORY AUTHORITIES
12 U.S.C. S194

24

12 U.S.C. S1823

24

12 U.S.C. S1823

25

Utah Code Ann. S7-2-1 et seq
10, 11,

1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,

14, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30, 33, 34

Utah Code Ann. S78-27-39

14

Utah Code Ann. S78-2-2(3) (j ) (1988)

1

Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-l(2) (h)

19

Utah Code Ann. S78-27-39U) [repealed 1986]

21

-v-

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann, $78-2-2(3)(j) (1988).

Appellant appeals from

the Third District Court's order refusing to lift a
statutorily-imposed stay and from the court's order affirming an
administrative denial of claim.
ISSUES PRESENTED
L

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refus-

ing to lift a statutory stay for a claimant who had not complied
with the administrative claim procedure mandated by statute and
whose claim was already on appeal to this Court in a case to
which the statutory stay was not applicable?
2.

Was it arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law for

the trial court to affirm the Receiver's denial of a claim for
contribution that has not yet arisen and that earlier had been
dismissed by judicial order?
3.

Did Utah's Takeover Act, which provides a compre-

hensive administrative procedure for filing claims against a
closed bank and provides for timely judicial review of the administrative decisions, deny appellants due process and access to
the courts?

-1-

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
1.

Utah Code Ann, §7-2-1 et seq., reproduced at A-l of

the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is the Court's first opportunity to interpret
Chapter Two of Title Seven of the Utah Code (the "Takeover Act")
which governs the closing of insolvent state-chartered banks.
Utah Code Ann. § 7-2-1 et seq.

The Takeover Act establishes pro-

cedures for the Utah Commissioner of Financial Institutions, or a
receiver he appoints, to reorganize or liquidate insolvent banks.
Appellant Fire Insurance Exchange (the "Insurer") challenges the
Takeover Statute as applied to its claim for contribution against
an insolvent bank, Rocky Mountain State Bank (the "Bank"), when
the claim had been dismissed in district court and was on appeal
to this Court at the time the Bank was closed.
In February 1983, the Crookstons, two borrowers whose
home had collapsed, were suing the Bank and the Insurer for negligence, intentional torts, and breach of contract.
[R 142-48]- .

The Bank and the Insurer had cross-claimed against

each other for contribution as joint tortfeasors.

1/

The format for citations to the Record is [R
-2-

].

The Crookston case was set for a May 26, 1987, jury
trial before Judge Frederick.

On May 21, 1987, the Crookstons

settled with the Bank and the Bank immediately moved for summary
judgment on the Insurer's cross-claim for contribution.

[R 130].

The Bank explained that the Crookstons had abandoned their negligence claims against all parties and argued that the Insurer
could maintain no claim for contribution with respect to intentional torts.

Brief of Appellant ("Insurer's Brief") pp. A

24-25.
Judge Frederick heard the motion for summary judgment
on May 26 before the jury was impaneled and granted it on the
basis that no right of contribution exists among intentional
tortfeasors under the applicable Utah statute.

[R 130]. The

Insurer objected to the timing of the hearing and appealed from
the Order granting summary judgment on the cross-claim.

That

appeal, Case No. 870252 ("the Cross-Claim Appeal") presents the
Insurer's argument about contribution among intentional joint
tortfeasors.

Insurer's Cross-Claim Brief pp. 22-36.

Following trial in the Crookston case, the jury
returned a verdict of $4,800,000 against the Insurer.

The

Insurer appealed that verdict and again raised the issue of contribution among intentional joint tortfeasors in Case No. 880034
(the "Jury Verdict Appeal").

Insurer's Jury Verdict Brief pp.
-3-

101-114.

This Court consolidated the Cross-Claim Appeal and the

Jury Verdict Appeal on the Insurer's ex-parte application, but
reversed that ruling on April 18, 1988, after a hearing.
[R 131-32].
Shortly after the Crookston trial, the Bank became
insolvent.

[R 130].

On August 28, 1987, the Commissioner of

Financial Institutions petitioned for an order approving his taking possession of Rocky Mountain State Bank pursuant to Utah Code
Amu §7-2-1 (1986) and S7-2-2 (1987).

[R 2].

By sheer coinci-

dence, the Petition came before Judge Frederick.

After a hear-

ing, Judge Frederick approved the actions of the Commissioner.
[R 8].
By statutory authority, the Commissioner immediately
appointed the FDIC as Receiver of the Bank.

[R 92-96].

The FDIC

Receiver entered into a Purchase and Assumption Agreement with
Citibank Utah whereby Citibank purchased the Bank's "good" assets
and assumed all of its deposit liabilities.

[R 13-19].

The FDIC

in its corporate capacity purchased from the FDIC Receiver the
remaining "bad" assets of the bank for $41,000,000. This amount
was equal to the deposit liabilities assumed by Citibank, less
the value of the assets purchased by Citibank and less a premium
of $700,000 paid by Citibank for the Bank's good will.

FDIC

Receiver paid the $41,000,000 to Citibank, and the district court
-4-

approved the three-cornered transaction after the hearing on
August 28, 1987.

[R 89-91].

As required by Utah Code Ann. S7-2-7 (1986), the district court Order of August 28, 1987 also ordered a stay of commencement or continuation of any judicial proceeding against the
Bank.

The stay applied to the Cross-Claim Appeal since the Bank

was a named party.

During the time the Cross-Claim Appeal was

consolidated with the Jury Verdict Appeal, the stay applied to
both actions.
The Cross Claim Appeal presents two arguments.

One is

the 14-page argument about contribution which is presented word
for word in the Jury Verdict Appeal and in this appeal as well.
Insurer's Cross Claim Brief pp. 22-36; Insurer's Jury Verdict
Brief pp. 101-114.

The other argument is that the Insurer had

insufficient time to respond to the Bank's motion for summary
judgment.

Insurer's Cross-Claim Brief pp. 10-21.

That argument

is also raised verbatim in the Jury Verdict Appeal.

Insurer's

Jury Verdict Brief pp. 89-100.
The Receiver posted the notice of taking as required by
S7-2-6U), [R 97-98], and published the Notice to Creditors
required by §7-2-6(2).

[R 195-96].

The notice advised all per-

sons with a claim to present their claims to the Receiver

-5-

pursuant to §7-2-6 which mandates that all claims against a
closed bank go through administrative process.
No notice by mail was sent to the Insurer since its
name did not appear on the Bank's records as a creditor of the
Bank and since the FDIC Receiver had no actual knowledge of the
pendency of the Cross-Claim Appeal.

[R 183 ]«

Section 7-2-6(2)

requires mailing of notice only to persons whose names appear as
depositors or other creditors upon the books and records of the
institution.
On March 9, 1988, the Insurer moved to lift the statutory stay of the Cross-Claim Appeal.

[R 1151.

The Receiver

opposed lifting the stay on the ground that the Insurer's claim
for contribution should first be filed with the Receiver pursuant
to §7-2-6.

[R 184-184].

Judge Frederick, sitting as the §7-2-2

supervisory court, denied the Insurer's motion to lift the stay
on May 16, 1988.

[R 211-212].

Judge Frederick's Order cited the

fact that the Supreme Court had de-consolidated the Jury Verdict
and Cross-Claim Appeals.

Id.

The district court was responsive

to the Insurer's desire to get its contribution argument before
the Supreme Court.

[R 588 pp. 12-14].

When the two appeals were

no longer consolidated, the Jury Verdict Appeal, containing the
contribution argument, was not affected by the stay.

-6-

In its motion to lift the stay, the Insurer claimed
that its Cross-Claim Appeal constituted a claim with the
Receiver.

The Receiver notified the Insurer that an appeal does

not constitute a claim as required by $7-2-6 and that any claim
evidenced by the appeal was denied because the claim had not yet
arisen and because a district court order had dismissed the
claim.

[R 542-43).

The Receiver also advised the Insurer in

writing of its right to appeal to the district court under Section 7-2-6(9).
On May 16, 1988, the Insurer filed a §7-2-6 claim with
the Receiver.

[R 206-7].

The Insurer asserted that it "may be

entitled to a right of contribution against Rocky Mountain State
Bank" and that the Bank "may become obligated to pay Fire Insurance Exchange in the future."

(Emphasis added).

[R 206].

The Receiver denied the claim because no claim for contribution had arisen and because a district court order had dismissed the claim.

[R 539-43].

The Receiver also advised the

Insurer that objections to denial would be heard at a Section
7-2-6(9) hearing set for August 1, 1988.

After that hearing, the

court affirmed denial of the claim [R 547-8], and the Insurer
appealed the order denying the claim as well as the order denying
the motion to lift the statutory stay.

-7-

[R 551].

The Insurer

did not move to lift the stay after it complied with the administrative procedure.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Insurer appeals from two orders issued pursuant to
the Takeover Act (Utah Code Ann, S7-2-1 et seq.);

One order

maintains a statutory stay and the other upholds the Receiver's
decision to deny the Insurer's claim for contribution.
The court did not abuse its discretion when it found no
cause to lift a stay in circumstances where the claimant had not
complied with administrative process mandated by statute and
where the claimant's issue was already on appeal to this Court in
the Jury Verdict Appeal.

When Rocky Mountain State Bank was

closed, the Takeover Act changed the procedure for resolving the
Insurer's claim for contribution, but the Insurer's substantive
rights are preserved in this appeal and in the Jury Verdict
Appeal«

Hearing three appeals instead of two can only add to

this Court's burden and cannot give the Insurer any relief beyond
that which it has sought in the two appeals this Court will hear.
The Insurer's claim for contribution was correctly
denied on the basis that it had not yet arisen and that there was
a prior judgment dismissing the claim.

The rights and liabili-

ties of an insolvent bank and its creditors are fixed at the date

-8-

of insolvency and no additional rights can be created after court
determination of a bank's insolvency.
Denial of the Insurer's claim for contribution, pursuant to the Takeover Act, did not deny due process or access to
the courts.

The Takeover Act provides administrative due process

and prompt judicial review of administrative decisions.
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED SOUND DISCRETION
IN FINDING NO CAUSE TO LIFT THE STAY
The Takeover Act provides a comprehensive scheme for
closing failed banks and for filing and processing claims of
interested parties.

The statutory scheme includes an automatic

stay of any action against the failed bank and allows modification of the stay for cause shown.
The district court's order denying the Insurer's Motion
to Lift the Stay stated that no cause had been shown to lift the
stay.

This Court reviews the district court's mixed finding of

fact/conclusion of law of "no cause" by an abuse of discretion
standard.

Marqulies By and Through Marqulies v. Upchurch, 696

P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985).
The district court properly exercised its discretion in
finding no cause to lift the stay because the Insurer had not

-9-

made an administrative claim for contribution required by §7-2-6
and because the issue of contribution was already before this
Court in the Jury Verdict Appeal.

The stay issue is now moot

because, although the Insurer eventually did comply with administrative process, it did not seek to lift the stay following
compliance.
A.

THE STATUTORY STAY CANNOT BE LIFTED FOR A CLAIMANT WHO HAS
NOT COMPLIED WITH THE STATUTE
The Takeover Act provides that "the court may, for

cause shown, terminate, annul, modify, or condition1* the automatic stay.

Utah Code Ann, §7-2-7(1) (1986).

Cause to lift the

stay must be reviewed in light of the purpose for imposing the
stay.

The statutory stay, like the stay in bankruptcy, is

imposed to compel compliance with the statutory scheme, which
includes a requirement that all claimants file their claims with
the Receiver.

Utah Code Ann. S7-2-6 (1987).

The Insurer asked

the court to lift the stay even though it had not filed the
required claim, and the Receiver opposed lifting the stay because
the Insurer had failed to file the required claim.
The closing of Rocky Mountain State Bank in August 1987
changed the Insurer's procedural rights much as a debtor's filing
for bankruptcy changes a creditor's procedural rights.
Bank was closed for insolvency, the Takeover Act stayed

-10-

When the

litigation and substituted an administrative procedure for consideration of claims, with a right to judicial review of the
Receiver's allowance or disallowance of a claim.

Utah Code Ann.

§7-2-6(9) (1987).
When statutes change procedure after initiation of a
suit, if the changes "do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy
vested or contractual rights,11 they apply "not only to future
actions, but also to accrued and pending actions as well."
Pilcher v. State Department of Public Services, 663 P.2d 450, 455
(Utah 1983); State Department of Social Services v. Hiqqs, 656
P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982).

Clearly a statute already in effect,

like the Takeover Act, legitimately changed the Insurer's procedural rights.

The Insurer's substantive rights were not changed

because it had no vested right to contribution when the Bank
closed.

See Uniqard Insurance Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d

1344 (Utah 1984).
Judge Frederick refused to lift the stay, in part,
because the Insurer had not exhausted its administrative remedies.

After the Insurer complied with the administrative claim

procedure, it did not petition to court to lift the stay.

Thus,

it is in no position to complain about the original refusal to
lift the stay.
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B.

THERE IS NO CAUSE TO LIFT A STAY WHEN THE ISSUE STAYED IS
ALREADY ON APPEAL
The Insurer argues that the Cross-Claim Appeal should

go forward so that it can appeal the question of whether it has a
right of contribution*

In his Order denying the motion to lift

the stay, Judge Frederick cited the fact that the Supreme Court,
upon hearing, revoked consolidation of the Cross-Claim Appeal and
the Jury Verdict Appeal.

[R 209].

The Judge concluded that if

the Insurer had one appeal pending on the question of whether
contribution exists between intentional tortfeasors, there was no
cause to lift the stay and allow a second appeal of the issue.
Since the Jury Verdict Appeal has been briefed and
remains only to be argued, the Insurer will get a ruling from the
Supreme Court on the contribution-among-joint-tortfeasors question.

Lifting the statutory stay to allow the Insurer to pro-

ceed with the Cross-Claim Appeal would not give the Insurer any
relief it has not requested in the appeal already pending.

If

the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the
litigants, this Court has held the case moot.

Jones v.

Schwendiman, 721 P.2d 893, 894 (Utah 1986).
As noted, the Jury Verdict Appeal presents exactly the
same 14-page argument on the Insurer's right to contribution that
is presented in the Cross-Claim Appeal and again in this case.

-12-

The contribution argument is properly before the Court in the
Jury Verdict Appeal since the merits were argued to the trial
courto

However, in this case, the merits of the argument were

not raised below.
The Insurer's Brief implies that the merits were presented below as a basis for lifting the stay:
Fire Insurance Exchange, in seeking to have
the stay lifted below, represented to the
Court that its research demonstrated that the
Court's ruling was in error on a critical
substantive issue, i.e., whether contribution
exists between intentional tortfeasors. (R.
588).
Insurer's Brief, p. 11.

However, the Insurer's citation to the

Record at 588 is simply the Insurer telling the Court it wants to
appeal the question of whether contribution exists between intentional tortfeasors; it does not include any representation about
research or about the merits of the issue.

[R 588 pp. 1-24].

Since the merits of the question of contribution were
not mentioned in the pleadings, at the hearing on the Motion to
Lift the Stay or in the court's order, that issue is not properly
before the Court in this Appeal and the Court should simply disregard Section I-A of the Insurer's brief.

Bundy v. Century

Equipment Co., Inc., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah, 1984).

However,

for the record, the FDIC notes a fundamental flaw in the
Insurer's contribution argument.
-13-

1.

The Insurer Has No Clear Right of
Contribution Under Utah Law

The Insurer labels as "clearly erroneous" the trial
court's conclusion that Utah Code Ann, S78-27-39 (as in effect
from 1973-1986) excludes intentional tortfeasors.

However, the

Insurer presents no statement from Utah statute or case law that
Utah's former Comparative Negligence Statute, of which §78-27-39
was a part, was intended to apply to intentional tortfeasors.
The Insurer's analysis ignores the title of the act
which reads as followst
Title of Acto
An act relating to actions for the
recovery of damages in actions based on negligence or gross negligence? removing contributory negligence as a bar to any recovery
under certain circumstances; providing for
the diminishing of any recovery in proportion
to the negligence of the person seeking
recovery; providing for separate judgments as
to damages in proportionate negligence; providing for contribution among joint
tortfeasors; providing for the release of one
or more joint tortfeasors without releasing
them all; and providing for the effect of
such releases on other joint tortfeasors. L.
1973 Ch. 209. (Emphasis added.)
Since by its terms the act relates only to actions based on negligence, the Insurer's citations from other jurisdictions whose
statutes are not so limited and from the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act are not persuasive.

-14-

The Insurer quotes from Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d
1349, 1351 (Utah 1986) a passage that calls the
negligence/contribution act by its official name:

the "Utah Com-

parative Negligence Act," (emphasis added), but offers no explanation why the actss name excludes intentional tortfeasors.
C.

THE INSUREDS DESIRE TO KEEP THE BANK IN THE UNDERLYING
ACTION PROVIDES NO CAUSE FOR LIFTING THE STAY,
The Insurer confuses its general sense of ill usage

with a right to specific relief when it argues in this appeal
that it has a right to require the Bank to remain as a defendant
in the underlying action.

Neither of the orders from which the

Insurer appeals in this case addresses the question of whether
the Bank should have remained a defendant in the underlying
action.
The refusal to lift the statutory stay was based on the
Insurer's failure to comply with the $7-2-6 claims procedure.
The denial of the Insurer's claim for contribution was based on
an existing order and on the fact that the Insurer had not paid
more than a prorata share of a judgment at the time the Bank was
closed.

Neither of the district court's orders has anything to

do with whether the same jury that decides an underlying action
should decide third-party claims.

-15-

The Insurer properly raised the question of a right to
have all the facts before the same tribunal in its Jury Verdict
Appeal.

Insurer's Jury Verdict Brief pp. 115-116,

But by

reversing either the order upholding the stay or the order denying the claim, this Court would have no impact on the question of
whether liability of the Bank to the Insurer should be decided in
the underlying action.
The Insurer states that although there is no Utah case
on point, it has a "vested right" to retain the Bank as a party
Defendant in the underlying action.

Insurer's Brief p. 26.

Con-

trary to the Insurer's assertion, a Utah case holds exactly the
oppositec

A party cannot claim a vested right in a claim that

does not yet exist; and this Court has held:
If one named as a defendant tortfeasor
impleads another alleged joint tortfeasor,
the defendant in the initial action does so,
not on the ground that a claim for relief
then exists against the third-party defendant, but on the ground that the third-party
defendant "may be liable" to the defendant in
the principal action.
Uniqard Insurance Company v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344,
1346 N.2 (Utah, 1984).
This Court has also held that the Comparative Negligence Act does not "mandate that the plaintiff must obtain jurisdiction over all the tortfeasors and bring them to trial so that
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the proportion of fault of each may be there determined,"

Cruz

v. Montova, 660 P.2d 723, 728 (Utah 1983).
Although the Insurer claims a "vested" right, the
authorities the Insurer cites refer only to convenience and judicial efficiency*
word "vest."

Insurer's Brief pp. 26-34*

No case uses the

The Insurer attempts to convert Rule 14 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure —

which permits a third-party claim to

be decided together with the underlying claim —
right to contribution.

into a vested

The authorities cited by the Insurer,

however, specifically hold that impleader "merely accelerates the
determination of liability and does not have the effect of
enlarging any substantive rights."

Patten v. Knutzen, 646 F.

Supp 427, 430 (D. Colo. 1986); C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure, S1448, pp. 263-65. (1971) (emphasis
added).
Rule 14 may allow accelerated determination of liability if the third-party plaintiff can satisfy the court that the
alleged joint tortfeasor "may be" liable to the third-party
plaintiff.

Rule 14 does not give a third-party plaintiff a

vested right of contribution.
D.

DUE STATUTORY NOTICE WAS PROVIDED AND THERE WAS NO WAIVER OF
THE STATUTORY STAY.
The Insurer alleges as "cause" to lift the stay the

theory that counsel for the Bank waived the stay by failing to
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promptly notify the Insurer of the stay.
That contention has no merit.

Insurer's Brief p. 35.

The stay is mandated by statute

and cannot be waived by an insolvent Bank's counsel.

The

Receiver, not Bank counsel, relied on the stay and opposed the
Insurer's motion to lift the stay in order to protect the
Receiver's rights, duties and obligations in administering the
Bank under Utah law*
Once the insolvent Bank was closed and the FDIC was
appointed as Receiver, the rights and obligations of the closed
bank were the responsibility of the Receiver, not of the attorneys employed in the Crookston case prior to the Bank's closing
by the Bank's liability insurance carrier.

The Receiver had no

knowledge of the Cross-Claim Appeal until the Insurer filed its
motion to lift the stay.

It then opposed lifting the stay.

That

conduct is no "waiver" of the statutory stay.
E.

THE INSURER PRESENTS THE COURT WITH THE "WHOLE
PICTURE" IN ITS JURY VERDICT APPEAL.
The Insurer argues that it may suffer prejudice in hav-

ing to present its claims piecemeal.

Again, neither order

appealed from offers any relief from piecemeal presentation.
Furthermore, the Insurer's Jury Verdict Appeal raises all the
issues addressed in the Cross-Claim Appeal.

What the Insurer is

really insisting on is a right to raise every claim three times.
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The Insurer's desire to present the "whole picture" thrice to
this Court gives no legitimate cause to lift the stay.
II
THE RECEIVER PROPERLY DENIED THE INSURER'S
CLAIM FOR CONTRIBUTION AGAINST THE BANK'S ASSETS
The Insurer appeals from the district court's order
affirming disallowance of its §7-2-6 claim for contribution
against the Bank's assets in the possession of the Receiver.
Since the Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to actions
or review of actions under the Takeover Act, Utah Code Ann.
S63-46b-l(2)(h), the Takeover Act itself prescribes the scope of
review of the order affirming the Receiver's denial of the
Insurer's claim for contribution.

The FDIC as Receiver stands in

the shoes of the Commissioner, Utah Code Ann. §7-2-9(1) (1987),
and the court "may not overrule a determination or decision of
the Commissioner if it is not arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent,
or contrary to law."-'' Utah Code Ann. §7-2-2(4) (1987).
The Insurer acknowledges that before the Bank's insolvency, Judge Frederick entered an order denying contribution
among intentional tortfeasors.

The Insurer also admits in the

The 1989 Amendments to § 7-2-6(9) (SB185) expressly
made that criterion applicable to review of decisions of a
receiver allowing or disallowing claims. Utah Code Ann. §
7-2-6(9)(c), effective May 1, 1989.
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very language of its claim filed with the Receiver that its claim
for contribution is one to which it "may be entitled" and that
the Bank "may become obligated to pay Fire Insurance Exchange in
the future*"

[R 206].

In its Brief to this Court, the Insurer

concedes the claim "might have technically remained in an inchoate state0" Insurer's Brief p. 38.

In light of these admissions,

the Insurer cannot claim the Receiver's decision to deny the
claim was arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Ae

RES JUDICATA REQUIRED THE RECEIVER TO DENY THE
INSURER'S CLAIM FOR CONTRIBUTION,
The only legal precedent in Utah that addresses the

question of contribution among intentional joint tortfeasors is
the district court's 1987 ruling that there is no contribution
among intentional tortfeasors.

The Receiver correctly cited that

decision as a basis for denying the Insurer's claim for contribution against an alleged intentional joint tortfeasor.

The

Receiver made the only decision it could make in light of the law
that governed when it made its decision.
When summary judgment adjudicates a claim on its merits, the judgment invokes the doctrine of res judicata.

Makin v.

Liddle, 696 P.2d 918,919 (Idaho App. 1985); Seeborq v. General
Motors Corp., 588 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Or. 1978); Restatement (Second) of Judgments §19, Comment (g) (1980).
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Furthermore, even if

a judgment is later overruled by an appellate court, it is nonetheless conclusive while it stands.

El Paso Natural Gas v.

State, 599 P.2d 175, 178 (Ariz. 1979); C. Wright and A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure, §4433 (1971).
Thus Judge Frederick's order, which granted summary
judgment and ruled that there is no right of contribution among
intentional tortfeasors, is res judicata on the question unless
and until this Court reverses the ruling.
B.

NO RIGHT OF ACTION FOR CONTRIBUTION HAS ARISEN
The Utah Comparative Negligence Act in effect when the

underlying tort was committed provided:
(1) The right of contribution shall
exist among joint tortfeasors but a joint
tortfeasor shall not be entitled to a money
judgment for contribution until he has, by
payment, discharged the common liability or
more than his prorata share thereof.
Utah Code Ann. S78-27-39U) [repealed 1986].
This Court has interpreted that passage as creating a
new cause of action, but only in a tortfeasor who has already
paid more than his prorata share of a common liability.
v. Salt Lake County, 551 P.2d 521, 522 (Utah 1976).

Brunyer

The Brunyer

Court held that a claimant had no right to contribution because
that claimant had not discharged more than a prorata share of a
common liability before enactment of the Comparative Negligence
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Act which established the right to contribution,

^d.

The act

does not create a cause of action for contribution in a
tortfeasor, like the Insurer, who has not paid any portion of a
judgment and who has not even obtained a judgment that the bank
is jointly liable.
The FDIC as Receiver correctly denied the Insurer's
claim for contribution because "irrespective of when the underlying tort action arises, a claim for contribution 'arises1 only
when a defendant meets the conditions specified by the Comparative Negligence Act"

Citing Uniqard Insurance Co. v. City of

Laverkin, 689 P.2d 1344, 1346 (Utah 1984).

[R 539-40].

Uniqard

makes it clear that the right of contribution does not arise when
the tort occurs, but rather arises "to rectify the inequity
resulting when one tortfeasor pays more than his share of the
common liability*"

689 P.2d at 1346.

No such inequity has

occurred in this case.
The Uniqard Court explained that when one tortfeasor
impleads another alleged joint tortfeasor, he does so "not on the
ground that a claim for relief then exists against the
third-party defendant, but on the ground that the third party
defendant 'may be liable'" to the tortfeasor.
(Emphasis added).
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Id. at N.2.

The Insurer admits its right to contribution "might
have technically remained in an inchoate state" pending its payment of more than its prorata share of the Crookston judgment.
Insurer's Brief p. 38.

But payment of the Crookston judgment is

only one of many steps separating the Insurer from a right of
contribution.

At this stage, the amount of a final judgment

against the Insurer is still uncertain*

Second, this Court must

overturn the district court's ruling that intentional joint
tortfeasors are barred from contribution.

Then the Insurer must

persuade a jury that the Bank committed some intentional tort in
common with the Insurer, even though the tort plaintiff asserted
no claim against the Bank.

The Insurer has no vested claim

against the Bank.
C.

NO RIGHT OF ACTION CAN BE CREATED AFTER A BANK'S INSOLVENCY
The Receiver's notice of denial further pointed out,

"It is well settled that the rights and liabilities of Rocky
Mountain State Bank and its creditors are fixed at the declaration of insolvency and no additional rights can be created after
such insolvency."

Citing FDIC v. McKniqht. 769 F.2d 658, 661

(10th Cir. 1985).

[R 540].

In the McKniqht case the Tenth Circuit determined the
rights of holders of cashier's checks issued shortly before the
bank was closed:
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The seminal point is the closing of Penn Square.
That event not only triggered the liquidation process, but also cast in stone the relationship of
defendants to the bank. "It is well settled that
the rights and liabilities of a bank and the
bank's debtors and creditors are fixed at the declaration of the bank's insolvencye"
769 Fo2d at 661, Citing American National Bank of Jacksonville v.
FDIC, 710 F.2d 1528, 1540 (11th Cir. 1983).
American National Bank involved claims to assets of a
closed state banke

The Eleventh Circuit held that the claimant's

'fattempt to rely on events subsequent to the bank's closing in
support of its claim of ownership to the escrow fund must fail
since the rights of the parties were frozen on April 13, 1970,
when the bank's doors were shut to business."

710 F.2d at

1540-41,
The reason for freezing rights with respect to national
banks is based on 12 U.ScC. S194 which requires payment of claims
on a prorata basis.

If claims that had not yet arisen could be

recognized, the Receiver could not make any interim prorata payments to creditors until all the uncertainties and contingencies
were resolved.
A similar reason applies to Utah chartered banks.

The

FDIC as Receiver has authority under federal law, 12 U.S.C.
S1823, and state law, S7-2-9(2)(b), to enter into purchase and
assumption agreements whereby another bank assumes the closed
-24-

bank's deposit and other liabilities*

Such an arrangement would

not be feasible if claims that had not yet arisen could be
asserted.

Under federal law, 12 U.S.C. $1823, the FDIC must make

a decision at the time of closing whether a purchase and assumption procedure or a straight liquidation is preferable.

Such a

decision must be made with great speed, usually overnight, in
order to preserve the going concern value of the failed bank and
avoid interruption in banking services.
U.Se _ ,

Lanqley v. FDICf 484

98 L.Ed.2d 340, 347 (1987).
In addition, under §7-2-16, a receiver may declare

interim dividends to proven claimants.

No such procedure could

be followed if claimants could assert claims based on
post-closing events.
The Utah legislature in the original enactment of
$7-2-6 did not expressly codify the well-settled rule that rights
are frozen on the date of takeover.
ture clarified its position:

However, the 1989 legisla-

"The rights of claimants and the

amount of a claim shall be determined as of the date the Commissioner took possession of the institution under this Chapter."
Utah Code Ann. S7-2-6(4)(c) (1989).

The Receiver's application

of the well-settled rule to the Insurer's claim has been ratified
by the Utah legislature.
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Ill
UTAKTS TAKEOVER ACT PRESERVES THE INSURER'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO
DUE PROCESS AND ACCESS TO THE COURTS
Point II of the Insurer's Brief contends that implementation of the Takeover Act unconstitutionally deprived it of due
process under the Federal and State Constitutions and violated
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution as to access to
the courts.
Ae

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT
An appellant may not raise before this Court issues it

did not raise in district court,

Bundy v. Century Equipment Co.

Inc., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984).

No reference to due process

was made in any of the proceedings, and the Insurer did not refer
to Section 11 in asking the district court to reverse the
Receiver's decision on the claim for contribution.
The constitutional issues on which the Insurer now
relies were given only cursory presentation to the Court belowf
and the Court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law on
the constitutional issues.

In such circumstances, this Court

should not consider the appeal.

Turtle Management, Inc. v.

Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667 at 672c
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Limited reference to the constitutional doctrines in
the district court, without any analysis before that court, does
not meet this Court's standards for appellate review.

State v.

Johnson, 771 Pc2d 362 (Utah App. 1989); James v. Preston, 746
P 0 2d 799, 802 (Utah App. 1987).

Nevertheless, the FDIC has

briefed the issue for this Court's consideration.
B,

THE TAKEOVER ACT PROVIDES REASONABLE PROCEDURES FOR
CLAIMS AGAINST A CLOSED BANK
The Takeover Statute (Utah Code Ann. §7-2-1 et seq.)

establishes the following reasonable remedies by due course of
laws
(1)

Takeover of insolvent depository institutions by

the Commissioner of Financial Institutions (§7-2-1);
(2)

Designation of a court to have jurisdiction over

the liquidation of the institution and the acts of the Commissioner and any receiver or liquidator appointed by the
Commissioner ($7-2-2);
(3)

Appointment of a receiver or liquidator with

appropriate powers and duties (§§7-2-9, 7-2-10 and 7-2-12);
(4)

Notice of the taking, notice to file claims, the

procedure for handling claims and judicial review of determinations by the receiver in allowing or disallowing claims
(§7-2-6);
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(5)

Stay of court proceedings against the institution

to enable the receiver to marshal the assets of the closed
bank and to provide for an orderly liquidation without
interference from litigation (§7-2-7); and
(6)

Establishment of priority for the payment of

claims against the institution (§7-2-15).
Subject only to secured claims, administrative
expenses, and unpaid wage claims for the 90-day period prior to
the closing, depositors' claims are given first priority by
§7-2-15o

Since the FDIC is the insurer of these claims,

§7-2=9(2) authorizes the Commissioner to appoint the FDIC as
receiver or liquidator.

The receiver may enter into purchase and

assumption agreements with another financial institution to allow
3/
depositors uninterrupted access to their accounts.-

1/

Following the Rocky Mountain State Bank purchase and
assumption transaction, the receiver has no assets to meet
the claims of Bank creditors. Whether any assets will be
available to pay claims subordinate to depositor claims as
defined in § 7-2-15 depends on the success of the FDIC in
liquidating the assets it purchased from the receiver to
carry out the purchase and assumption transaction. A similar procedure has been followed in the other ten Utah banks
closed since 1984, involving over $100,000,000 advanced by
the FDIC in its corporate capacity as insurer of the closed
banks' deposit liabilities. This procedure has protected
all deposits, even those exceeding the $100,000 insurance
limit.
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The Takeover Act's above comprehensive scheme
offers due process and full court access as further explained
below.
C.

THE TAKEOVER ACT SATISFIES DUE PROCESS AND OPEN COURT
REQUIREMENTS
Between March 9, 1988, when the Insurer sought to lift

the stay and September 2, 1988, when this appeal was filed, the
Insurer filed its administrative claim, received an administrative decision, and had two full hearings in district court.

The

Insurer received due process and full access to the courts.
1.

The Insurer Obtained Timely Judicial Review of Administrative Process
In Coit Independent Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 57 U.S.L.W.

4347 (March 21, 1989), the United States Supreme Court reviewed
the validity of an administrative procedure established by regulations of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board for handling claims
against insolvent savings and loan associations.

The FSLIC,

insurer of savings and loan deposits, had acted as receiver.

The

Supreme Court found that mandating an administrative procedure
for the processing of claims against the assets of a closed savings and loan association was a reasonable exercise of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's authority.

It concluded the Board

could reasonably determine that FSLIC as receiver "simply cannot
perform its statutory function unless it is notified of the
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entire array of claims against a failed association's assets and
has a reasonable period of time to make rational and consistent
judgments regarding those claims."

57 U.S.L.W. at 4353.

The Supreme Court found the FSLIC claims procedure to
be inadequate only insofar as the regulations failed to provide a
"clear and reasonable time limit11 on FSLIC*s consideration of
claims, thus unreasonably denying claimants their day in court.
57 UoScL.We 4347 at 4353.
In contrast, Utah's S7-2-6 clearly establishes a time
limit for the receiver to adjudicate claims.

The receiver must

act on claims within 180 days after final publication of notice.
Utah Code Ann. §7-2-6(4) (1987)e

The receiver must give notice

of its determination within 30 days after determination, and if a
claimant has not received notice of disallowance within 210 days
of the date of final publication of notice, the claim is considered allowed.
decision.

Id.

The district court reviews the receiver's

$7-2-6(9) (1987).
In the case at bar, the Insurer had a court determina-

tion of the validity of its claim within 90 days of its date of
filing.

Part of the 90 days was spent briefing and arguing the

merits of the claim before the district court.
When the district court approved denial of the
Insurer's claim, it rendered moot its earlier order refusing to
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lift the statutory stay pending administrative resolution of the
Insurer's claim by the Receiver.

The Insurer's claim for contri-

bution has been heard by the Receiver and the Receiver's determination has been reviewed by the district court and is now before
this Court on appeal.
2.

The Insurer's "Right" of Contribution is not an
Accrued, Individual Right Protected by the Constitution
The Insurer cites Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717

P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), to support its assertion that the Takeover
Act denies it due process and access to Court.

However, Berry

specifies that the constitutional protections operate only "once
a cause of action . . . accrues to a person by virtue of an
injury to his rights. . . . "

Id. at 676.

The "rights" protected

by the Open Courts provision are "injuries done to the substantive interests of person, property, and reputation."

_Id. at N.4.

In Berry, the substantive interest at issue was the
Plaintiffs' right to bring a wrongful death action.

By contrast,

the Insurer claims constitutional protection attaches to a
"right" of contribution which has not accrued, arisen, or vested
and which is not a fundamental personal or property right but is
merely designed to adjust the economic burden among tortfeasors
once common liability has been adjudicated.
3.

The Takeover Act Provides Effective, Reasonable Alternative Remedies for Vindication of Any Constitutional
Interest
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Before a constitutional remedy can be abrogated, Berry
requires either an effective, reasonable alternative remedy or a
need to eliminate a clear social or economic evil.

Id. at 680.

The first question is whether any constitutional remedy has been
abrogated in this case.
The Insurer contends that the Takeover Act denied its
right to maintain an action for contribution against the Bank.
However, the Insurer has no such right because it has not paid a
common liability*

Furthermore, it was first the district

court—not the Takeover Act—that denied the claim for contribution, and the Receiver simply followed legal precedent.

The

Insurer is characterizing as a constitutional complaint what is
merely the Insurer's disagreement with the district court's decision,,

The Insurer has enjoyed open courts and due process; it

simply does not like the outcome of the process.
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that some remedy
has been abrogated, the Takeover Act provides the effective, reasonable remedies by due course of law required by Berry.

The

prompt administrative decision followed by prompt judicial review
that the Insurer received is by definition effective, reasonable
and due course of law.
As noted above, the Coit decision found the only defect
in FSLIC's procedure to be a lack of reasonable time limit for
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completion of the administrative procedure,.

That defect does not

exist in the Utah statutory scheme.
4.

The Takeover Act Eliminates a Clear Economic Evil.
The "social and economic evil" analysis outlined in

Berry is applicable only "...if there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided. . . . "

717 P.2d at 680.

Again, assuming

for purposes of argument that the Insurer had a constitutional
remedy before the Bank closed, the effective substitute remedy
provided by the Utah statutory procedure in §7-2-1 et seq. has
been followed to the letter.

The Insurer had its day in court at

the district court level and is now appealing that decision.
Although there is no need to reach the "social or economic evil" test, the Takeover Act eliminates economic evils.
The United States Supreme Court recognized in Coit "the social or
economic evil" of litigation against the receiver without affording the receiver notice "of the entire array of claims against a
failed association [bank's] assets and reasonable period of time
to make rational and consistent judgments regarding those
claims."

57 U.S.L.W. 4347 at 4353.
Another economic evil eliminated by the statutory stay

of litigation against the Receiver is the wasting of the
Receiver's assets.

The cost of defending litigation against the

Receiver constitutes administrative expense.
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Administrative

expenses have priority over deposit and other claims against the
Bank.

Utah Code Ann. £7-2-15(1)(b) (1987).

Thus, absent the

stay, assets of the insolvent bank would be consumed in defending
litigation aimed at establishing claims which the legislature has
determined have a lesser priority than depositors' claims.
With respect to the "social and economic evil" test,
the Insurer states that "the Insurer understands and admits that
the bank represents that it has no assets available to satisfy
any portion of the $4.8 Million judgment entered in the related
underlying action."

Insurer's Brief p. 41.

It is true that the

Receiver lacks Bank assets because the purchase and assumption
agreement with Citibank was necessary to meet depositor claims
under §7-2-15.

However, if the Insurer is found to be entitled

to a claim against the closed Bank's assets, the Insurer would
receive a Receiver's certificate evidencing the claim.
The Receiver's certificate would be payable, subject to
the priorities set by §7-2-15 and the provisions of the agreement
whereby the FDIC purchased the "bad" assets of the bank not purchased by Citibank, from any recoveries by the FDIC on the closed
Bank's assets.

That would be true of all claims filed and

approved by the Receiver under §7-2-6.

The imposition of the

stay until the Insurer filed its §7-2-6 claim in May 1988 in no
way affected that result.
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The Takeover Act provides constitutional due process
and access to the courts*

Its implementation by the Receiver in

this case did not deprive the Insurer of any constitutional
right,
CONCLUSION
If this Court upholds Judge Frederick's ruling on contribution among intentional joint tortfeasors when it considers
the Jury Verdict Appeal, the Insurer has no claim for contribution and no basis for appeal in this case or in the Cross-Claim
Appeal.

If the Court allows contribution among intentional

tortfeasors, the orders appealed from in this case were still
correct when made.
The FDIC asks the Court to affirm the Order refusing to
lift the stay because it was an appropriate exercise of the
court's discretion and to affirm the Order affirming the
Receiver's disallowance of claim because it was not arbitrary,
capricious or contrary to law.
DATED this 3 0

day of May, 1989.

Peter W. Billings
Michele Mitchell
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, a
Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation
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ADDENDUM

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

139

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

7-1-807

(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the commissioner, any supervisor, or any examiner of the department may:
(a) have and maintain savings, transaction, or
other accounts, or certificates and deposits in any
financial or depository institution in the state, or
a share or share draft account in any credit union
in the state, or a thrift savings account or own
any thrift certificates of deposit in any industrial
loan corporation, or be a lessee of a safe deposit
box on the same terms and conditions available
to the public generally;
(b) be indebted to a savings and loan association, bank, or other institution under the supervision of the department upon (i) a mortgage loan
upon the mortgagor's own home; and (ii) an installment debt transferred to an institution in
the regular course of business by a seller of consumer goods; and
(c) continue to receive payments under a regularly established pension plan of general application for fully retired employees of an institution
under the supervision of the department.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) any supervisor
or examiner may be indebted to any institution under
the supervision of the department if: (a) the loan is
obtained under the same circumstances, conditions,
and terms available at the time to the general public,
(b) the loan is a consumer loan as defined in Section
70B-3-4, (c) the loan is for the personal use of the
supervisor or examiner, his spouse, or dependent children, (d) in the case of examiners, the loan is not
obtained from a class of institutions normally examined by the examiner, and (e) in the case of supervisors, the loan is not obtained from an institution under his supervision.
(4) Full disclosure in writing of any indebtedness
incurred under Subsection (2) or (3) shall be filed in
the commissioner's office.
(5) Any person who violates this section shall forfeit his office or employment a n d is guilty of a third
degree felony.
1983

from paying interest to two persons at the same time
on funds in the process of transfer.
The process or the practice referred to as pyramiding or any similar process or practice as defined by
the commissioner, and such definition is approved by
the governor, shall be prohibited within this state
and persons found guilty of these schemes shall be
found guilty of a class C misdemeanor. This shall not
preclude more serious punishment under federal law.
Money market funds, similar funds and bank regulated institutions shall cooperate with the commissioner to stop these practices.
1981

7-1-804. Malfeasance o r nonfeasance by commissioner, supervisor or examiner as
misdemeanor — Removal from office.
If the commissioner, a supervisor, or an examiner
wilfully neglects to perform any duty provided for by
law, or knowingly or wilfully permits the violation of
any of the provisions of law for a period of 90 days by
any institution under the supervision of the department, or knowingly or wilfully makes any false statement concerning any such institution, or is guilty of
any misconduct or corruption in office, he or she is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and shall be removed from office by the governor.
1981

7-2-2.

7-1-805. Repealed.

1983

7-1-806. Money market funds arranging with
bank to honor two-party instruments
— Discouraging payment of interest to
two persons on funds in transit — Pyramiding and similar schemes as misdemeanors.

7-1-807. Printed checks, drafts and orders —
Requirements — Violation as misdemeanor.
Every check, draft, order, or other like instrument
printed for a customer of any institution issuing
transaction accounts in the state as part of a series
after the effective date of this act shall have on its
face the name and address of the account holder, the
month and year the account was opened, and the
number of the check, draft, order, or other like instrument in unbroken, sequential, numerical order, beginning with the number 101, except for initial deposits to open a new account or in case of lost or stolen checks when a limited supply of unnumbered
counterchecks may be issued. Any person who violates this section is guilty of a class C misdemeanor.
1983

CHAPTER 2
POSSESSION OF DEPOSITORY
INSTITUTION BY
COMMISSIONER
Section
7-2-1.

7-2-3.
7-2-4.
7-2-5.
7-2-6.
7-2-7.
7-2-8.
7-2-9.
7-2-10.
7-2-1 1

Supervisory actions by commissioner —
Grounds — Mergers or acquisitions authorized by commissioner — Possession
of business and property taken by commissioner .
Jurisdiction of district court — Supervision
of actions of commissioner in possession
— Authority of commissioner and court.
Action for injunction against commissioner
in possession — Procedure — Appeal.
Consent required for institution to resume
business.
Appointment of receiver or assignment for
creditors — Notice required — Commissioner taking possession.
Notice of possession by commissioner —
Presentation, allowance and disallowance of claims — Objections to claims.
Stay of proceedings against institution.
Special deputies or agents — Appointment
— Bond.
Liquidation of institution — Appointment
of liquidator or receiver.
Inventory of assets — Listings of claims —
Report of proceedings — Filing — Inspection.
SnPPlfll rnnnQAl

F m n l n v m o n f Kv a*-+r»*._

/-3-1
Section
7-2-13.
7-2-14.
7-2-15.
7-2-16.
7-2-17.
7-2-18.
7-2-19.

7-2-20.
7-2-21.
7=2-22.

FIINAWCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Collections in liquidation — Deposit —
Preference.
Expenses during possession.
Priority of obligations, expenses, and
claims.
Interim ratable dividends.
Disposition of records after liquidation.
Plan for reorganization or liquidation of institution — Hearings — Procedure — Effect — Appeals.
Suspension of payments by institution —
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governor — Period effective — Exempt
payments — Operation during suspension — Modification of orders — Adoption of rules and regulations.
Repealed.
Applicability of Utah Procurement Code.
Termination of authority to transact business.

7-2°l. Supervisory actions by commissioner —
Grounds — Mergers or acquisitions
authorised by commissioner — Possession of business and property taken by
commissioner.
(1) An institution under the jurisdiction of the department shall be subject to supervisory actions by
the commissioner under this chapter or Chapter 19 if
the commissioner, with or without an administrative
hearing, finds that:
(a) an officer of an institution or other person
has refused to be examined or has made false
statements under oath regarding its affairs;
(b) an institution or other person has violated
its articles of incorporation or any law, rule, or
regulation governing the institution or other person;
(c) an institution or other person is conducting
its business in an unauthorized or unsafe manner, or is practicing deception upon its depositors,
members, or the public, or is engaging in conduct
injurious to its depositors, members, or the public;
(d) an institution or other person has been notified by its primary account insurer of the insurer's intention to initiate proceedings to terminate such insurance or is otherwise not in a
sound and safe condition to transact its business;
(e) an institution or other person has failed to
maintain a minimum amount of capital as required by the department, any state, or the relevant federal regulatory agency;
(f) a depository institution has failed or refused to pay its depositors in accordance with the
terms under which the deposits were received, or
has or is about to become insolvent;
(g) an institution or other person or its officers
or directors have failed or refused to comply with
the terms of a duly and legally authorized order
issued by the commissioner or by any federal authority or authority of another state having jurisdiction over the institution or other person;
(h) an institution or other person or its officers
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this title or any rule or regulation of the department issued under it;
(j) any person who controls an institution or
other person subject to the jurisdiction of the department has used the control to cause the institution or other person to be or about to be in an
unsafe or unsound condition, to conduct its business in an unauthorized or unsafe manner, or to
violate this title or any rule or regulation of the
department issued under it; or
(k) the remedies provided in Section 7-1-307,
7-1-308, or 7-1-313 are ineffective or impracticable to protect the interest of depositors, creditors,
or members of the institution or other person, or
to protect the interests of the public.
(2) If the commissioner finds that any of the conditions set forth in Subsections 7-2-l(l)(a) through (j)
exist with respect to an institution under the jurisdiction of the department, and if the commissioner also
finds that an order issued pursuant to Section
7-1-307, 7-1-308, or 7-1-313 would not adequately
protect the interests of the institution's depositors,
creditors, members, or other interested persons from
all dangers presented by the conditions found to exist,
or if two-thirds of the voting shares of an institution
under the jurisdiction of the department which are
eligible to be voted at any regular or special meeting
of the shareholders of the institution duly called for
that purpose are voted at the meeting in favor of a
resolution consenting to the commissioner taking or
causing to be taken any of the actions described below, he may:
(a) without taking possesson of the institution,
authorize, or by order of the commissioner require or give effect to, the acquisition of control
of, the merger with, the acquisition of all or a
portion of the assets of, or the assumption of all
or a portion of the liabilities of the institution or
other person by any other institution or entity
approved or designated by him in accordance
with the provisions of Chapter 19; or
(b) take possession of the institution or other
person subject to the jurisdiction of the department with or without a court order, if an acquisition of control of, a merger with, an acquisition of
all or a portion of the assets of, or an assumption
of all or a portion of the liabilities of the institution or other person without taking possession
does not appear to him to be practicable. Upon
taking possession, the commissioner is vested by
operation of law with the title to and the right to
possession of ail assets, the business, and property of the institution or other person subject to
court order made under Section 7-2-3. While in
possession of an institution or other person, the
commissioner, or any receiver or liquidator appointed by him, may exercise any or all of the
rights, powers, and authorities granted to the
commissioner under the provisions of this chapter, or may give effect to the acquisition of control of, the merger with, the acquisition of all or a
portion of the assets of, or the assumption of all
or a portion of the liabilitv of an institution or
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has all the powers and privileges provided by law
with respect to the liquidation or receivership of
an institution, its depositors, and other creditors,
including but not limited to, entering into an
agreement for the purchase of assets and assumption of deposit and other liabilities by another depository institution. Such action by a federal deposit insurance agency may be taken upon
approval by the court, with or without prior notice. Such actions or agreements may be disapproved, amended, or rescinded only upon a finding by the court that the decisions or actions of
the receiver or liquidator were arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or contrary to law.
(3) The liquidator or receiver may employ assistants, agents, and legal counsel at reasonable compensation determined by the liquidator or receiver
and approved by the commissioner. All expenses incident to the liquidation or receivership shall be paid
out of the assets of the institution. If a liquidator or
receiver is not the guaranty corporation, the Utah
Credit Union League, the Credit Union Insurance
Corporation, or the applicable federal deposit insurance agency, the liquidator or receiver and any assistants and agents shall provide bond or other security
approved by the commissioner for the faithful discharge of their duties in connection with the liquidation or receivership and the accounting for money
handled by them. The cost of the bond shall be paid
from the assets of the institution. Suit may be maintained on the bond by the commissioner, and if the
institution is a member of the guaranty corporation,
by the guaranty corporation, and if the institution is
a member of the Credit Union Insurance Corporation,
by the corporation, or by any person injured by a
breach of the condition of the bond.
(4) (a) Upon the appointment of a liquidator or receiver for an institution in possession pursuant to
this chapter, the commissioner and the department are exempt from liability or damages for
any act or omission of any liquidator or receiver
appointed pursuant to this section.
(b) This section does not limit the right of the
commissioner to prescribe and enforce rules regulating a liquidator or receiver in carrying out
its duties with respect to an institution subject to
the jurisdiction of the department.
1987
7-2-10.

Inventory of assets — Listings of claims
— Report of proceedings — Filing —
Inspection.
As soon as is practical after taking possession of an
institution the commissioner shall make or cause to
be made in duplicate an inventory of its assets, one
copy to be filed in his office and one with the clerk of
the district court. Upon the expiration of the time
fixed for presentation of claims the commissioner
shall make in duplicate a full and complete list of the
claims presented, including and specifying claims disallowed by him, of which one copy shall be filed in his
office and one copy in the office of the clerk of the
district court. The commissioner shall in like manner
make and file supplemental lists showing all claims
presented after the filing of the first list. The supplemental lia+a aihall V\e> fHaA a\rnmj aiv m/M-i

7-2-12

make a detailed report in duplicate of the proceeding,
showing the disposition of each asset and acquired
asset, one copy to be filed in his office and one with
the clerk of the district court. The report, inventory,
and lists of claims shall be open at all reasonable
times for inspection.
1983

7-2-lie

Special counsel — Employment by attorney general.

Upon taking possession of any institution or other
person subject to the jurisdiction of the department,
the commissioner may request the attorney general
to employ special counsel on his behalf to assist and
advise him in connection with a liquidation or reorganization proceeding and the prosecution or defense of
any action or proceeding connected with it.
1983

7-2-12. Powers of commissioner in possession —
Sale of assets — Post-possession financing — New deposit instruments —
Executory contracts — Transfer of
property — Avoidance of transfers —
Avoidable preferences.
(1) Upon taking possession of the institution, the
commissioner may do all things necessary to preserve
its assets and business, and shall rehabilitate, reorganize, or liquidate the affairs of the institution in a
manner he determines to be in the best interests of
the institution's depositors and creditors. Any such
determination by the commissioner may not be overruled by a reviewing court unless it is found to be
arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or contrary to law.
In the event of a liquidation, he shall collect all debts
due and claims belonging to it, and upon approval of
the court may compromise all bad or doubtful debts.
He may sell, upon terms he may determine, any or all
of the property of the institution for cash or other
consideration, subject to final approval of the court.
The commissioner shall give such notice as the court
may direct to the institution of the time and place of
hearing upon an application to the court for approval
of the sale. The commissioner shall execute and deliver to the purchaser of any property of the institution sold by him those deeds or instruments necessary
to evidence the passing of title.
(2) With approval of the court and upon terms and
with priority determined by the court, the commissioner may borrow money and issue evidence of indebtedness. To secure repayment of the indebtedness,
he may mortgage, pledge, transfer in trust, or hypothecate any or all of the property of the institution
superior to any charge on the property for expenses of
the proceeding as provided in Section 7-2-14. These
loans may be obtained for the purpose of facilitating
liquidation, protecting or preserving the assets in the
charge of the commissioner, expediting the making of
distributions to depositors and other claimants, aiding in the reopening or reorganization of the institution or its merger or consolidation with another institution, or the sale of all of its assets. Neither the
commissioner nor any special deputy or other person
lawfully in charge of the affairs of the institution is
under any personal obligation to repay those loans.
The commissioner may take any action necessary or
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shareholder of the institution or any depositor or
other creditor of the institution may appear and be
heard on the application. Prior to the obtaining of a
court order, the commissioner or special deputy in
charge of the affairs of the institution may make application or negotiate for the loan or loans subject to
the obtaining of the court order.
(3) With the approval of the court pursuant to a
plan of reorganization or liquidation under Section
7-2-18, the commissioner may provide for depositors
to receive new deposit instruments from a depository
institution that purchases or receives some or all of
the assets of the institution in the possession of the
commissioner. All new deposit instruments issued by
the acquiring depository institution may, in accordance with the terms of the plan of reorganization or
liquidation, be subject to different amounts, terms,
and interest rates than the original deposit instruments of the institution in the possession of the commissioner All deposit instruments issued by the acquiring institution shall be considered new deposit
obligations of the acquiring institution. The original
deposit instruments issued by the institution in the
possession of the commissioner are not liabilities of
the acquiring institution? unless assumed by the acquiring institution. Unpaid claims of depositors
against the institution in the possession of the commissioner continue, and may be provided for in the
plan of reorganization or liquidation.
(4) The commissioner, after taking possession of
any institution or other person subject to the jurisdiction of the department, may terminate any executory
contract, including unexpired leases and unexpired
employment contracts, to which the institution or
other person is a party. If the termination of an executory contract or unexpired lease constitutes a breach
of the contract or lease, the date of the breach is the
date on which the commissioner took possession of
the institution.
(5) With approval of the court and upon a showing
by the commissioner that it is in the best interests of
the depositors and creditors, the commissioner may
transfer property on account of an indebtedness incurred by the institution prior to the date of the taking.
(6) (a) The commissioner may avoid any transfer
of any interest of the institution in property or
any obligation incurred by the institution that is
void or voidable by a creditor under Chapter 1,
Title 25.
(b) The commissioner may avoid any transfer
of any interest in real property of the institution
that is void as against or voidable by a subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable
consideration of the same real property or any
portion thereof who has duly recorded his conveyance at the time possession of the institution is
taken, whether or not such a purchaser exists.
(c) The commissioner may avoid any transfer
of any interest in property of the institution or
any obligation incurred by the institution that is
invalid or void as against, or is voidable by a
creditor that extends credit to the institution at
the time possession of the institution is taken by
the commissionpr anH that rkH+ai«a «+ «™u ^ —
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unaffected by and without regard to any knowledge of the commissioner or of any creditor of the
institution.
(e) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, or disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including
retention of title as a security interest.
(f) The commissioner may avoid any transfer
of any interest in property of the institution to or
for the benefit of a creditor, for or on account of
an antecedent debt owed by the institution before
such transfer was made, made or suffered by the
institution while insolvent, on or within 120 days
before the time possession of the institution is
taken by the commissioner, or between 120 days
and one year before the time possession is taken
if the creditor at the time of such transfer had
reasonable cause to believe that the institution
was insolvent, the effect of which transfer will be
to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than he would be entitled to
under the provisions of Section 7-2-15. For the
purposes of this subsection:
(i) the institution is presumed to have
been insolvent on and during the 120 days
immediately preceding the time possession is
taken by the commissioner;
(ii) a transfer of any interest in real property is deemed to have been made or suffered
when it became so far perfected that a subsequent good faith purchaser of such property
from the institution for a valuable consideration could not acquire an interest superior
to the transferee; and
(iii) a transfer of property other than real
property is deemed to have been made or suffered when it became so far perfected that a
creditor on a simple contract could not acquire a lien by attachment, levy, execution,
garnishment, or other judicial lien superior
to the interest of the transferee.
1987
7-2-13* Collections in liquidation — Deposit —

Preference.
The moneys collected in process of a liquidation by
the commissioner shall be from time to time deposited, subject to his order as herein provided, in one or
more federally insured depository institutions organized under the laws of this state. In case of the suspension or insolvency of the depository institution,
these deposits shall be preferred before all other deposits.
1981

7-2-14. Expenses during possession.
The expenses reimbursable to the commissioner
during possession or in the course of proceedings under this chapter include the compensation of deputies,
agents, clerks, and examiners employed by him and
reasonable fees for counsel, accountants or consultants employed by him or on his behalf. The compensation shall be fixed by the commissioner subject to
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Priority of obligations, expenses, and

claims.
(1) The following obligations, expenses, and claims
have the following priority:
(a) first, any obligation the commissioner may
have under Subsection 7-2-6(3)(b) to be bound by
the terms, covenants, and conditions of obligations secured by assets or property of the institution;
(b) second, administrative expenses, including
those allowed under Section 7-2-14;
(c) third, unsecured claims for wages, salaries,
or commissions, including vacation, severance, or
sick leave pay, earned by an individual within 90
days before the date of the commissioner's possession in an amount not exceeding $2,000 for each
individual;
(d) fourth, claims of depositors, other than
those of controlling persons, as defined in Section
7-8a-9. Any federal deposit insurance agency or
other deposit insurer is subrogated to all rights of
the depositors to the extent of all payments made
for the benefit of the depositors. The right of any
agency of the United States insuring deposits or
savings obligations to be subrogated to the rights
of depositors upon payment of their claims may
not be less extensive than the law of the United
States requires as a condition of the authority to
issue such insurance or make such payments to
depositors of national banks;
(e) fifth, all other unsecured claims in
amounts allowed by the court, including claims
of secured creditors to the extent the amount of
their claims exceed the present fair market value
of their collateral. The claim of a lessor for damages resulting from the termination of a lease of
property may not be allowed in an amount in
excess of the rent reserved by the lease, without
acceleration, for 60 days after the lessor repossessed the leased property, or the leased property
was surrendered to the lessor, whichever first occurs, whether before or after the commissioner
took possession of the institution, plus any
unpaid rent due under the lease, without acceleration, on the date of possession or surrender. A
claim for damages resulting from the termination of an employment contract, may not be allowed in an amount in excess of the compensation provided by the contract, without acceleration, for 90 days after the employee was directed
to terminate, or the employee terminated, performance under the contract, whichever first occurs,
whether before or after the commissioner took
possession of the institution, plus any unpaid
compensation due under the contract, without acceleration, on the date the employee was directed
to terminate or the employee terminated performance. Claims for damages resulting from the
termination of employment contracts of persons
who were in control of the institution within the
meaning of Subsection 7-1-103(7) are not entitled
to priority under this subsection;
(f) sixth, claims for debt that are subordinated
under the provisions of a subordination agreement or other instrument:
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This classification is final, subject to review by the
court upon a timely objection filed under Subsection
7-2-6(9).
1987
7-2-16. Interim ratable dividends.
At any time after the expiration of the date fixed
for the presentation of claims and prior to the declaration of a final dividend the commissioner may, out
of the funds remaining in his hands after the payment of expenses, declare one or more interim ratable
dividends, such dividends to be paid to such persons
and in such amounts and upon such notice as may be
directed by the court.
1981

7-2-17. Disposition of records after liquidation.
After liquidation of an institution under this chapter, the commissioner shall dispose of its books, papers, and records in accordance with the order of the
court.
i9Si
7-2-18. Plan for reorganization or liquidation of
institution — Hearings — Procedure —
Effect — Appeals.
(1) If the commissioner has taken possession of any
institution or other person under the jurisdiction of
the department he may propose to the court a plan for
the reorganization or liquidation of the institution or
the establishment of a new institution by filing a petition with the court, setting forth the details of the
plan and requesting the court to set a day for hearing
on the petition.
(2) The court shall make an order fixing a day for
the hearing of the petition, prescribing the manner in
which notice of the hearing is given, and may prescribe a deadline for filing written objections. The
court may adjourn the hearing from time to time and
no further notice is required. At the time of hearing
or any adjournment of a hearing the court shall take
testimony, and if it appears that it is in the best interests of the depositors and other creditors, the court
shall approve the plan.
(3) A plan of reorganization or liquidation approved by the court shall be fully binding upon and
constitute a final adjudication of all claims, rights,
and interests of all depositors, creditors, shareholders, and members of the institution being reorganized or liquidated, and all other parties in interest
with regard to the plan and with regard to any institution or other person receiving any assets or assuming any liabilities under the plan.
(4) Notice of an appeal of an order approving a plan
of reorganization or liquidation shall be filed within
ten days after the date of entry of the order appealed
from.

1986

7-2-19. Suspension of payments by institution —
Order of commissioner — Approval of
governor — Period effective — Exempt
payments — Operation during suspension — Modification of orders — Adoption of rules and regulations.
(1) The commissioner, whenever in his opinion the
action is necessary in the public interest, may, if the
governor approves, order such institutions as are sub-
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tended from time to time for further periods not exceeding 60 days each.
(3) Nothing contained in this chapter shall affect
the right of the institutions to pay current operating
expenses and other liabilities incurred during a period of suspension.
(4) Whenever in the opinion of the commissioner
conditions warrant such action, he may, if the governor approves, authorize the issuance of clearing
house certificates, post notes or other evidences of
indebtedness, either during a period of suspension, or
during such longer period as he may prescribe, and
during a period of suspension, he may permit the suspended institution to receive deposits and may authorize any such institution to pay any part of its liabilities, or of any class thereof, payment of which has
been suspended.
(5) He may, if the governor approves, at any time,
by order, modify or rescind any or all previous orders
made by him under authority of this chapter.
(6) The commissioner may, if the governor approves, prescribe such rules and regulations as he
considers necessary in order to carry out the provisions of this chapter, and an order may be issued on
such terms and conditions a s may be incorporated in
the order.
1381
7-2-20.

7-2-22. Termination of authority to transact
business.
If an institution or other person subject to the jurisdiction of the department is operated by a federal
deposit insurance agency or its appointee pursuant to
a federal receivership or conservatorship for a period
of 180 days or more, the authority of that institution
or person to transact business under this title shall
terminate upon the expiration of the 180-day period
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7-3-31.
7-3-32.
7-3-33.

7-3-35.
7-3-36.
7-3-37,
7-3-39.

1987

Application of chapter.
Restrictions on conduct of banking business and bank holding companies.
"Banking business" defined.
7-3-9. Repealed.
Powers, rights, and privileges of banking
corporation — Other business activities.
Certificate of incorporation — Prerequisites to issuance.
Prohibited investments and loans.
Changes in articles of incorporation restricted.
Capital stock increase — Prerequisites.

7-3-2. Restrictions on conduct of banking business and bank holding companies.
(1) The establishment or operation in this state of
private or partnership banks is expressly prohibited.
(2) Except as authorized by Chapter 19, Title 7,
Section 7-1-702, or as specifically authorized by the
laws of the United States by language to that effect
and not merely by implication:
(a) No corporation or other business entity organized other than under the laws of this state
may establish or maintain an office or other
place of business in this state at which banking
business is conducted.
(b) No corporation or other business entity organized other than under the laws of this state
may conduct a banking business in this state unless it complies with all laws of this state relating
to banks, to the conduct of a banking business,
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7-3-12.
7-3-13.

7-3-23.
7-3-24.
7-3-25.
7-3-26.
7-3-27.
7-3-28.
7-3-29.
7-3-30.

Limitations on loans and extensions
credit.
Bank acquiring, holding, or accepting
collateral its own stock — Loans to
investment in affiliates.
Stock ownership by banks.
Certificates and evidences of deposit bin*
ing — Issuance of items intended to cir
culate as money prohibited.
Repealed.
Certification of check.
Bad debts.
Overdraft as asset.
Repealed.
Capital notes or debentures.
Repealed.
Board of directors to manage business —
Residency of directors.
Oath of bank directors.
Meetings of board of directors — Reports —
Records — Loans to officers, directors
and principal shareholders.
Examination of affairs by board of directors
— Purposes — Frequency — Report filed
in bank records.
Contents of examination report of board of
directors — Failure to make and file report as misdemeanor.
Examinations in lieu of directors' examination — Report filed with board minutes.
Loans to officers, directors and stockholders.
7-3-38. Repealed.
Shareholders' right to examine bank
records — Records as to a particular customer.

7-3-1. Application of chapter.
This chapter applies to all banks organized under
the laws of this state, to all other banks doing business in this state as permitted by the laws and Constitution of the United States, and to all persons conducting banking business in this state except as provided in Chapter 1.
1981

CHAPTER 3

7-3-11.

7-3-21.
7-3-22.

1987

1986

7-3-3.
7-3-4 to
7-3-10.

7-3-20.

7-3-34.

Repealed.

7-2-21. Applicability of Utah Procurement
Code.
No action of the commissioner taken under this
chapter or Chapter 19 is subject to the provisions of
Chapter 56, Title 63, the Utah Procurement Code.

Section
7-3-1.
7-3-2.

Section
7-3-19.
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